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ABSTRACT
The Space Station Freedom (SSF) altitude strategy provides guidelines and assumptionsto determine an altitude
profile for Freedom. The process for determining an altitude profile incorporates several factors such as where the
Space Shuttle will rendezvous with the SSF, when reboosts must occur, and what atmospheric conditions exist
causing decay.
The altitude strategy has an influence on all areas of SSF development and mission planning. The altitude strategy
directly affects the micro-gravity environment for experiments, propulsion and control system sizing, and Space
Shuttle delivery manifests. Indirectly the altitude strategy influences almost every system and operation within the
Space Station Program.
Evolution of the SSF altitude strategy has been a very dynamic process over the past few years. Each altitude
strategy in turn has emphasized a different consideration, examples include a constant Space Shuttle rendezvous
altitude for mission planning simplicity, or constant micro-gravity levels with its inherent emphasis on payloads, or
lifetime altitudes to provide a safety buffer to loss of control conditions.
Currently a new altitude strategy is in development. This altitude strategy will emphasize Space Shuttle delivery
optimization. Since propellant is counted against Spcae Shuttle payload-to-orbit capacity, lowering the rendezvous
altitude will not always increase the net payload-to-orbit, since more propellant would be required for reboost. This
altitude strategy will also consider altitude biases to account for Space Shuttle launch slips and an unexpected
worsening of atmospheric conditions. Safety concerns will define a lower operational altitude limit, while radiation
levels will define upper altitude constraints.
This paper will discuss the evolution of past and current SSF altitude strategies and the development of a new
altitude strategy which focuses on operational issues as opposed to design.
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I INTRODUCTION
Productive utilization of the Space Station Freedom
(SSF) will depend on a careful blend of many operational
factors. One of the most influential of these factors is
to determine what operational altitudes SSF should fly.
This paper discusses the current program altitude
strategy used for system design and introduces
modifications to this strategy intended to transition
altitude related considerations into the operational era.
The organization of the remaining portion of this paper
is as follows: Section II familiarizes the reader with the
background necessary for a basic understanding of
SSF altitude strategies. Section III presents a
historical perspective of SSF altitude strategy
evolution. The primary drivers as well as advantages
and disadvantages of each strategy are discussed.
Section IV presents the current program altitude
strategy used to design and size systems. Section V
discusses considerations for an operational altitude
strategy. Only through careful evaluation of such
considerations can an altitude strategy be developed
which optimizes the key performance parameters.
Finally, Section VI presents conclusions regarding the
operational altitude strategy and future altitude work.
II BACKGROUND
The term altitude strategy is used throughout this
paper and must be defined at this point. An altitude
strategy refers to a set of guidelines and assumptions
necessary to determine where SSF will operate.
Altitude planners will use the altitude strategy to
generate a set of lower (Space Shuttle/SSF
rendezvous) and upper (reboost) altitudes.
Specifically, the guidelines presented in the altitude
strategy will provide a methodology for computing both
lower and upper altitudeswhile the assumptions provide
the necessary conditions to perform the analysis. From
the altitude strategy, mission planners can estimate
Space Shuttle delivery capability for manifest planning
and reboost requirements for propulsion system sizing
and resupply.
Currently, the lower (rendezvous) altitude is
constrained by lifetime to a loss of control altitude. At
the loss of control altitude (assumed to be 150 nmi [278
km]), the atmospheric torques would quickly overwhelm
the SSF control system, making rescue impossible and
catastrophic re-entry inevitable. This lifetime altitude
was chosen to give the SSF Program adequate
response time (90 days) in case of a total propulsion
system failure. Thus, the lowest allowable altitude at
which SSF may operate is defined as 90 days of decay
to 150 nmi and is herein referred to as the lifetime
altitude. System designers use the lifetime altitude
as a design point since it represents the highest
atmospheric densities the SSF will encounter. During
the operational era, SSF altitude planners will choose
rendezvous altitudes based on numerous factors.
These factors include SSF safety, life cycle costs,
delivery system utilization, radiation limits, mission
planning, orbital debris density, mission requirements,
and launch window considerations. Even after
consideration of all previously mentioned factors, SSF
altitude planners may still want to further bias the
planned SSF rendezvous altitudes from the lifetime
altitude to account for unpredictable, yet expected,
deltas (e.g., Space Shuttle launch slips or atmospheric
worsening).
The upper (reboost) altitudes are determined from the
rendezvous altitudes and the Space Shuttle flight
schedule. The SSF will reboost to an altitude such that
at the end of the flight interval, SSF will have decayed
down to the chosen rendezvous altitude by the next
planned Space Shuttle visit. Figure 1 depicts a
segment of an altitude profile. It is assumed SSF will
reboost as soon as operationally possible after Space
Shuttle departure to ensure Space Shuttle/SSF
rendezvous at the lowest point possible, thus
maximizing Space Shuttle delivery capability.
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Figure 1: Space Shuttle/SSF Rendezvous and SSF
Reboost Profile
Determining both the rendezvous and reboost SSF
operating altitudes is dependent on SSF rate of decay
for a specified period of time, the Space Shuttle flight
interval. The rate of decay is primarily tied to two
parameters: the atmospheric density and the ba/listic
number (BN, characterizing a vehicle's resistance to
orbital decay).
Atmospheric Density and Solar Cycle
Predictions
Density is the key atmospheric parameter used by
trajectory analysis programs and represents the
greatest uncertainty for altitude planners. The rate of
vehicle altitude decay is proportional to the
atmospheric density and inversely proportional to the
BN:
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where h is the SSF altitude, p is the atmospheric
density as a function of h, r is the mean radius of the
earth, and C is a constant. Atmospheric density
calculations are based on the energy output from the
sun, which varies over an eleven year solar cycle.
During peak solar energy output, the Earth's
atmosphere expands outward, similar to a balloon when
heated. Likewise, during minimum solar energy output,
the atmosphere contracts. The net result is that any
vehicle maintaining a relatively constant altitude
experiences widely varying density levels during a solar
cycle.
There are numerous methodologies available for
determining atmospheric density. The model accepted
by the SSF Program is the Jacchla 1970
atmospheric model (Reference 1). This model
primarily uses two solar parameters to calculate
density, solar flux (F10. 7) and geomagnetic index (A_)).
Given the variation of both measurements over a solar
cycle, the Jacchia atmosphere model will predict the
atmospheric density for any given date and orbital
position (altitude, latitude, and longitude).
Predictions for both F10.7 and Ap are provided by the
Mission Analysis Division at the Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) (Reference 2). Predictions for both
mean (statistically, the actual value should be below
the predicted value 50% of the time) and +20
(statistically, the actual value should be below the
predicted value 97.7% of the time) atmospheres are
provided by MSFC and are shown in Figure 2.
Generally, the +20 atmospheric predictions are
considered conservative, used mainly during system
sizing and critical operational periods such as
assembly. The mean atmospheric predictions are used
when estimating resupply/return requirements during
nominal SSF operations after assembly complete (AC).
Solar cycle predictions have been normalized to an 11-
year cycle. Actual past solar cycles have ranged from
g to 13 years. Because actual F10.7 and Apvalues
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Figure 2: MSFC Solar Flux Predictions
may be significantly different than predicted, the
operational altitude strategy must specify how and
when SSF reacts to changes in atmospheric conditions.
Ballistic Number Estimations
While the BN is a key parameter in determining SSF
orbital decay, SSF configuration experts are still
uncertain as to how accurate BN predictions can be at
this stage of SSF development. BN is calculated using
the following relationship:
BN = _ (2)
(34"Area
where Area equals the area exposed in the direction of
motion(+XLVLH), and Cd equals 2.3 (a typical drag
coefficient for orbiting spacecraft).
The exposed area in the +XLVLHdirection varies over an
orbit due to articulating elements such as the solar
arrays and thermal radiators. The exposed area also
varies with SSF attitude. While torque equilibrium
attitudes are maintained, the exposed area varies over
an orbit since these attitudes are adjusted to account
for atmospheric density changes. Therefore, even the
best predictions for BN are an average for one orbit.
During assembly, the BN varies significantly as SSF
elements are added to the growing configuration. This
fact produces uncertainty in determining SSF orbit
lifetimes and precise rendezvous altitudes.
Altitude Strategies
There are four basic approaches to defining
rendezvous altitudes as part of an altitude strategy.
Each approach is centered around an operational
preference considered to be of paramount importance
(i.e., planning simplicity, disturbance levels, safety, or
life cycle costs). Development of an operational
altitude strategy will consider both the virtues and
failings of each approach.
. Constant altitude maintenance requires
varying the magnitude of the reboost with
changing density levels over the course of a solar
cycle. A constant rendezvous altitude has an
obvious benefit, i.e., mission planning simplicity.
Design of standard Space Shuttle rendezvous
profiles and long range payload-to-orbit estimates
for manifest planning are definite advantages.
However, the rendezvous altitude selected must
not violate lifetime considerations at any time
during the solar cycle. This forces the altitude
selection to be based on predicted conditions at
the solar cycle peak. The solar cycle peak
represents a relatively small segment of the entire
solar cycle, lasting only 6 to 18 months. At off-
peak times during the solar cycle, the rendezvous
altitudes are considerably higher than dictated by
lifetime considerations, thus representing a
Space Shuttle delivery penalty. Therefore, a
constant rendezvous altitude profile trades Space
Shuttle payload-to-orbit capability for operational
planning simplicity.
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Constant micro-gravity altitude
maintenance limits the Space Shuttle/SSF
operational altitudes to a maximum micro-gravity
(p.g) level. Since the maximum density
encountered is at the lowest point in SSF
trajectory, and atmospheric acceleration is a
direct function of atmospheric density, a specified
I_g level defines the rendezvous altitudes. This
approach takes advantage of the varying
atmospheric density levels over a solar cycle by
lowering rendezvous altitudes when the
atmosphere contracts. In this way, Space Shuttle
delivery capability can be appreciably increased
compared to the constant altitude strategy.
For the constant p.g altitude strategy, each Space
Shuttle/SSF rendezvous occurs at the same
atmospheric l_g level or decay rate. Therefore,
the decay rate varies little over the solar cycle.
Since both the rendezvous and reboost altitudes
are tied to decay, any change in parameters which
influences decay, such as the BN or atmospheric
conditions, will cause the entire altitude profile to
be biased, but result in relatively constant SSF
propellant requirements. This aspect of the
constant I_g altitude strategy simplifies the design
of the propulsion system and propellant resupply
planning since requirements are not affected by
major changes in SSF configuration or
atmospheric predictions.
This approach has the apparent benefit of
providing users with a maximum expected Izg
environment during nominal operations (except
during planned perturbations such as Space
Shuttle docking and SSF reboost). Although this
strategy was accepted by the SSF Program for
many years, the basic premise is very misleading.
The specified Izg limits the aerodynamic torques
9J_. Gravity gradient torques are considerably
higher, as much as an order of magnitude within
the laboratory modules. Gravity gradient torques
vary with distance from the SSF center of gravity
(CG). The farther from the CG, the greater the
gravity gradient torque. Only at the CG are the
gravity gradient torques equal to zero and the
aerodynamic torques alone determine the overall
SSF i_g environment. Since few, if any,
experiments could be located at the CG, users
should not assume maximum disturbance levels
are limited by altitude.
Constant lifetime altitude maintenance sets
rendezvous altitudes at the minimum allowable
lifetime level. This approach attempts to
maximize the Space Shuttle payload-to-orbit
capability by rendezvousing as low as possible.
There are two major drawbacks to this approach.
First, there is no altitude margin for unplanned or
unexpected events such as a Space Shuttle
launch slip or atmospheric worsening. Second,
any change to SSF BN or atmospheric predictions
will significantly change previous estimates for
Space Shuttle payload-to-orbit and propellant
requirements. The rendezvous altitudes are
.
directly linked to the predictions for BN and
atmospheric conditions.
This approach is useful, however, in defining
system sizing requirements since the minimum
lifetime altitudes represent the lowest allowable
operating altitudes and thus the largest system
requirements. This lifetime altitude strategy is
discussed in detail in Section IV and currently is
incorporated in the Space Station Projects
Description and Requirements Document, JSC
31000 (Reference 3), and is a change request to
the Space Station Program Definition and
Requirements Document (PDRD), JSC 30000
(Reference 4).
Optimal altitude maintenance sets the
rendezvous altitude at a point which maximizes
net payload-to-orbit (total Space Shuttle delivery
capacity minus SSF reboost propellant
requirements). Both the reboost propellant usage
and Space Shuttle delivery capability are directly
related to altitude. The lower the Space Shuttle
rendezvous with SSF, the more Space Shuttle can
deliver to orbit (a rule of thumb is an additional 100
Ibm/nmi). However, the lower SSF operates, the
more propellant required for reboost since the
atmosphere is more dense, thereby causing
greater decay. The altitude which maximizes
Space Shuttle net payload-to-orbit is called the
optimal (optimum) altitude (shown in Figure
3). The optimal altitude defines the altitude at
which flying lower would cause more additional
propellant to be used than gained in Space Shuttle
payload-to-orbit, and flying higher would cause
more Space Shuttle payload-to-orbit lost than
would be saved in reduced propellant needs.
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Figure 3: Optimal Altitude Definition
An altitude strategy based on optimal altitudes
has the advantage of being relatively insensitive
to changes in configuration and atmospheric
predictions. Although these changes will cause
the optimal point to move, the resultant loss in
2O0
net payload-to-orbitincreasesat a surprisingly
slowrateas actualaltitudesdivergefromthe
optimalpoint.Thisapproachwillbeusedasa
basis for an operational altitude strategy
discussed in Section V.
III HISTORICAL VIEW
The SSF altitude strategy has evolved with program
maturity over the past several years. Beginning simply
with a constant altitude strategy early in Phase B, the
altitude strategy has evolved to its present state where
it is in transition from a system design emphasis to an
operational emphasis. Although this process of change
appears simple enough, it has been a long and arduous
road. As the SSF Program evolved, various altitude
related issues were rearranged in relative importance.
Each priority change represented a new altitude
philosophy or strategy. To date, altitude strategies
have been used to identify operational envelopes for
system design. Although these altitude strategies
have been used as a basis for operational cost studies,
it is understood that these altitude strategies have not
adequately addressed operational issues which will
ultimately drive the operational altitudes. A brief
description of each altitude strategy as they evolved
from early Phase B concept studies to the present is
provided below.
Constant Rendezvous Altitude
270 nmi !500 km} Constant Altitude
Early Phase B rendezvous altitudes for the SSF were
set at a constant 270 nmi. The 270 nmi altitude served
to minimize the drag and thus the propellant
requirements for resupply. This was the highest the
SSF could fly and maintain safe levels of crew radiation
exposure. Although the 270 nmi altitude was chosen
without explicit concern for the SSF lifetime, it did
provide sufficient safety at the peak of the solar cycle
in terms of a catastrophic re-entry into the atmosphere.
Maintaining a constant lower altitude meant that the
reboost sizes needed to be varied throughout the solar
cycle in order to decay to the same altitude for the next
Space Shuttle rendezvous. Figure 4 clearly shows the
variation of the reboost sizes with the changes in the
solar activity.
At this time in program history, the standards used to
determine acceptable crew radiation exposure levels
were re-evaluated. Radiation standards established by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) were adopted in lieu of more liberal NASA
standards. As a result, many of the reboost altitudes
violated OSHA radiation exposure levels for both the
eyes and skin. This forced a program requirement
which set the upper bound for SSF operations at 270
nmi. To accommodate this new requirement
rendezvous altitudes were lowered to 250 nmi (463 kin)
which ensured that operational altitudes would remain
within the 270 nmi radiation limit.
250 nmi (463 km) Constant Altitude
Resulting from the concerns for crew radiation
exposure levels, the rendezvous altitudes were lowered
to 250 nmi. This strategy resulted in an altitude profile
which at no time violated radiation limits for the crew.
The constant 250 nmi constant altitude strategy (Figure
5) was accepted by the Space Station Program later in
Phase B (circa 1984).
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FIGURE 4:270 nmi Constant Altitude Strategy with
Solar Flux Data
Advantaoe of a Constant Altitude Strateov
A constant altitude strategy provides mission planners
with a relatively constant target altitude and thus
constant payload-to-orbit capability. Standardized
Space Shuttle/SSF rendezvous profiles are also
possible with a constant altitude strategy, thus
simplifying such planning.
Disadvantaqes of a Constant Altitude Strategy
Maintaining a constant altitude profile has several
disadvantages that severely impact the program.
Although Space Shuttle payload-to-orbit remains
constant over a solar cycle, large variations in the
reboost complicate the overall Space Shuttle manifest
planning. Another disadvantage is that a system
designed using a constant altitude strategy severely
limits operational flexibility. Several space station
systems are sized based on constraints set by the
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altitude strategy and Space Shuttle flight schedule.
The operational altitude profile cannot be lower than the
system design profile (constant rendezvous altitudes)
since the systems can be sized to operate at higher
altitudes. An obvious example of this would be the
propulsion system; higher altitudes generally require
smaller reboosts. This would result in propellant tanks
inadequately sized to operate at lower altitudes.
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FIGURE 5:250 nmi Constant Altitude Strategy with
Solar Flux Data
Near the end of Phase B conceptual studies, assembly
concerns began to surface. Additional assembly flights
or additional payload-to-orbit are required to make
assembly even possible. Since the constant altitude
strategy was determined by choosing an altitude at the
worst point in the solar cycle, altitudes at off-peak
times could be lowered to gain significant Space Shuttle
delivery performance while maintaining acceptable orbit
lifetimes. At this point, payload-to-orbit was a
paramount concern, and a new altitude strategy had to
be developed in which the rendezvous altitude varied
with the solar cycle.
Constant Micro-Gravitational Level
The constant I_g altitude strategy was developed to
take advantage of solar cycle changes by defining the
rendezvous altitudes at a specified constant I_g. The
acceleration experienced by SSF is a function of the
atmospheric density; however, the atmospheric density
varies over the solar cycle. For this reason, and also
so that SSF users could have an input in determining
the altitude profile, a constant p.g strategy became the
accepted altitude strategy for SSF. The I_g level
represents the maximum drag acceleration SSF will
experience due to atmosphere effects. This is because
the SSF/Space Shuttle rendezvous occurs at the
lowest point in SSF trajectory (reboost occurs shortly
after Space Shuttle departs).
Constant .3 !1o Level
The PDRD (JSC 30000) baselined the constant p.g level
at .3 p.g (.3x10 "sg) later in Phase B, around 1986.
Variations in the lower altitude caused by the solar
cycle can be seen in Figure 6. The .3 I_g altitude
strategy introduced a concept referred to as the
minimum controllable altitude (the point at which SSF
was deemed uncontrollable and catastrophic re-entry
was inevitable). However, this altitude could not be
defined because the SSF Program was unable to agree
upon the conditions which would describe this point. As
it turned out, several of the lower altitudes defined by
this strategy did not meet acceptable orbit lifetime
limits. Therefore, to alleviate this concern, the _g level
was lowered from .3 to .2 I_g- This change increased
the safety margin or lifetime, decreased the size of the
reboosts since the new altitude profile was higher in the
atmosphere, decreased the atmosphere disturbance
level, and also decreased Space Shuttle delivery
capability.
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FIGURE 6: Constant .3 I_g Altitude Strategy with
Solar Flux Data
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Constant .2 Lta Level
JSC 31000 (Reference 5) baselined .2 p.g as the new
constant pg level. This change to a .2 pg level was
made for several reasons. The .3 pg level placed SSF
at altitudes that were determined to have unacceptable
orbit lifetimes of less than 50 days to 150 nmi. At .3 pg,
the SSF was flying at altitudes that were so low that the
configurations necessary to maintain control were
determined to be unacceptable. Figure 7 shows the
altitude profile for a .2 p.g altitude strategy. While this
new strategy placed SSF above the ill-defined minimum
controllable altitude and had acceptable flight
configurations, it had its problems as well. As the BN of
SSF got worse due to a more realistic analysis of its
configuration, the .2 p.g strategy put SSF at altitudes
that violated radiation requirements. The strategists
also realized that the emphasis of an altitude strategy
was really directed towards system sizing. Therefore, a
strategy was needed that forced the designs to meet
the maximum requirements on the station's systems.
That concept evolved into the lifetime variable altitude
strategy.
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FIGURE 7: Constant .2 pg Altitude Strategy with
Solar Flux Data
Advantages of a Constant ug Level Strategy
By taking advantage of the changing energy output of
the sun, a constant I_g strategy allows for increased
payload-to-orbit during times of lower solar activity.
This is a significant savings in terms of payload
capability not only during assembly but also in terms of
life cycle costs throughout the 30-year operational
lifetime of SSF. Another advantage to this strategy is
that it provides a guaranteed p.g environment for
payloads and experiments. This is a benefit to gravity
sensitive experiments. However, as mentioned earlier,
this premise can be misleading since the IJg level will be
at the guaranteed level only at the exact SSF CG.
Disadvantages of a Constant uO Level Strategy
The main disadvantage of the constant p.g strategy is
that the lifetime from the rendezvous altitudes varies
significantly over a complete solar cycle. In light of the
Challenger (51-L) accident, a lifetime reference has
assumed greater importance for safety considerations.
The need for defining a minimum operational period that
SSF must be able to survive without a Space Shuttle
visit was identified. Using a .3 p.g level, the lifetime
varied from 50 to 160 days of orbital lifetime to 150 nmi.
A .2 pg level varied from 90 to 330 days of orbital
lifetime to 150 nmi over a solar cycle. Although the .2
I_g strategy altitudes were an improvement over the .3
p.g level's lifetime, it was determined that several .2 pg
altitudes had unacceptable orbit lifetime margins and
thus the lifetime variable altitude strategy was
developed.
Lifetime Altitude
It was determined that the altitude strategy needed at
this point in the program must emphasize system
design for SSF, thus defining the minimum design
altitude. The strategies discussed thus far all
recognized the concept of minimum orbit lifetime.
Although the pg strategies were aware of a minimum
controllable altitude, orbital lifetime to this altitude was
the underlying concern. How much time does SSF have
before it decays and enters the earth's atmosphere?
What time frame would a contingency scenario require
to rescue SSF after a catastrophic failure? This idea of
the time necessary to save SSF resulted in an altitude
strategy that defined the minimum design altitude
(operational altitude limit) and based it on orbit lifetime.
The strategy calls for SSF to be able to survive a total
failure of its propulsion system for a period of at least
90 days without a loss of attitude control. It is felt that
a rescue and repair mission for saving SSF could be
made ready and launched within this amount of time.
Therefore, the minimum design altitudes are defined as
the altitudes which give SSF 90 days of lifetime to 150
nmi. The 150 nmi loss of control altitude was
determined to be the altitude where the aerodynamic
torques would overwhelm the attitude control system
and a loss of control would result. The altitudes
resulting from the lifetime altitude strategy can be seen
in Figure 8.
Presently, the lifetime strategy is incorporated in the
latest revision of JSC 31000 (Reference 3). At the time
of this writing, a change request submitted in 1988 to
the program (Reference 6) is awaiting final approval
before acceptance into the Space Station Program
Definition and Requirements Document (PDRD)
(Reference 4), JSC 30000. However, the idea of
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lifetime is now widely accepted throughout the SSF
Program.
Advantaaes of the Lifetime Variablg Altitude
The lifetime altitude strategy incorporates and corrects
several of the ideas and problems identified in previous
strategies. While the .3 p.g strategy mentioned a
minimum controllable altitude, the lifetime altitude
strategy defines one. As in the p.g altitude strategy,
lifetime altitudes vary with the solar cycle, taking
advantage of the changing energy output of the sun.
Lifetime altitudes represent the lowest operating
altitudes allowable, thus providing two very important
parameters: maximum payload-to-orbit and system
design requirements. As mentioned earlier, the
minimum altitude represents the maximum requirement
imposed on several SSF systems. Sizing to these
altitudes provides for the most flexible operation of
those systems.
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FIGURE 8:90 Day Lifetime Altitude Strategy with
Solar Flux Data
Disadvantaoes of the Lifetime Strateov
Operationally, lifetime altitudes provide a reference to
safety. However, they are difficult to plan, since they
are based on SSF characteristics and solar flux
predictions which both may be updated as the actual
flight date approaches. Additionally, the varying I_g
level experienced by flying lifetime altitudes presents
difficulties to p.g sensitive experimenters in both
planning and data reduction.
IV CURRENT STRATEGY
The main purpose of the current lifetime altitude
strategy was to identify and provide an altitude strategy
that emphasized system design while providing
adequate safety margins for SSF and its crew. The
current altitude strategy defines an operational altitude
envelope. Since this strategy reflects operational
limits, systems are designed to the extremes of this
range. The current lifetime altitude strategy levies
requirements on the SSF Program and has been
submitted for final approval into the SSF PDRD, JSC
30000.
SSF shall orbit between a minimum
operational altitude, defined by operational
lifetime to 150 nmi, and a maximum
operational altitude, defined by radiation
limits. (Reference 6, Sec. 3.1.1.1)
Assembly
The minimum operational altitude is further divided into
the two identifiable regions of SSF operations,
assembly and post-AC.
The minimum operational altitude for assembly
is defined as the altitude that provides 180
days of orbital decay to 150 nmi prior to a
verified, dual fault tolerant reboost system,
and 90 days of decay to f50 nmi thereafter.
The decay shall be calculated using +2o solar
flux predictions. (Reference 6, Sec 3.1.1.1.1 )
Dual fault tolerance ensures that SSF has adequate
lifetime prior to its propulsion system being completed.
Once the system is dual fault tolerant, SSF can
maintain the minimum altitude of 90 days to 150 nmi.
While the present baseline assembly altitudes
attempted to satisfy these minimum operational altitude
requirements, they were chosen with more emphasis
placed on planning simplicity. The present baseline
assembly sequence is contained in the Space Station
Stage Summary Databook 12/15/89 (Reference 7). The
Databook defines 220 nmi (407 kin) as the rendezvous
altitudes for flights 1 through 5 (MB-1 - MB-5) and 190
nmi (352 kin) for flights 6 through 29 (MB-6 - L-11).
These defined assembly rendezvous altitudes do not
take advantage of the variations in the atmosphere but
act as placeholders to simplify long range Space
Shuttle manifest planning.
Figure 9 shows the Databook defined rendezvous
altitudes and the minimum design rendezvous altitudes
for the baseline assembly sequence. Recent studies
have shown the 220 nmi altitudes to be conservative
compared to the required 180 days to 150 nmi lifetime
altitudes (-15 nmi, or 350 extra days of lifetime).
However, the 220 nmi altitudes are being used as the
design-to altitudes for Space Shuttle planning since
historically it is easier to give capability back to the
2O4
programthantotakeit away. As the SSF design and
launch schedule mature, these altitudes may be
lowered to provide increased payload-to-orbit. Several
lifetime violations occur at the transition from 220 nmi to
190 nmi altitudes. These violations stem from dramatic
changes in SSF configuration (solar photovoltaic (PV]
arrays are delivered and deployed on flight 6 [MB-6]).
Lifetime violations also occur later in the sequence at
flights 20 (MB-13) through flight 29 (L-11). These
violations occur as a direct result of increasing solar
activity. Figure 9 also depicts the solar flux values
predicted for during assembly. Significant resistance to
change the assembly altitudes exists in the Space
Station program. However, these lifetime violations are
significant and need to be addressed. The authors
recommended to the Mission Planning and Analysis
Division (MPAD NASA) at the Johnson Space Center
(JSC), and to the Assembly Planning Review (APR),
that the minimum lifetime altitudes be used as the
planning altitudes for Space Shuttle manifest planning
on those flights with lifetime violations. The long range
planning altitudes and manifests must be reworked to
correct these problems.
contingency atmosphere conditions.
Contingency atmosphere conditions are
induced increases in solar flux values due to
the effects of a +2 s_gma solar flux prediction
combined with a 2 year first element launch
slip and a 9 year solar cycle 22. (Reference 6,
Sec 3.1.1.1.1)
Analysis of the defined assembly altitudes with a 2-year
first element launch (FEL) slip in conjunction with +20
solar flux predictions show the 220 nmi altitude to have
approximately the same conservative margin, although
significantly greater lifetime violations occur at flight 8
(OF-l) through flight 29 (L-11). (See Figure 10.)
Analysis results show that there are 11 additional
lifetime violations when compared to the results of just
the +2o atmosphere study. These additional lifetime
violations arise from moving the assembly sequence
forward two years into a region of higher solar flux
values. The shift in the solar cycle is clearly shown in
FK3ure10 when compared with that in F_ure 9.
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FIGURE 10: Effects of a 2-Year First Element Launch
Slip on the Minimum Design Altitudes Showing the Solar
Cycle Shift
Additional requirements must be met by the assembly
altitudes that were not considered in the previously
mentioned study:
SSF shaft be capable of maintaining the
minimum operational altitude under
The requirement for a 9-year solar cycle has not yet
been analyzed at the time of this publication. However,
this only increases the solar flux values towards the
end of assembly since the solar minimum would shift
back toward the FEL point. A g-year solar cycle
analysis would result in lifetime violations of greater
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magnitude due to the increased solar flux values. It
needs to be determined if the two year FEL slip and 9-
year solar cycle are necessary biases, and, if so, to fly
the minimum design altitudes in place of defined
altitudes for each assembly flight which violate the
lifetime requirement.
Assembly Complete
The altitude requirements for assembly complete (AC)
are slightly different than those for assembly.
The minimum operational altitude for assembly
complete shall be the altitude that provides 90
days of orbital decay to 150 nmi using the
most current solar flux values. (Reference 6,
Sac 3.1.1.1.2)
The lifetime altitude defines the minimum altitude that
the SSF can fly during post-AC. Presently, the post-AC
rendezvous altitudes are set at this minimum
operational altitude. The SSF will rendezvous at this
altitude and SSF will reboost as soon as operationally
possible after the Space Shuttle departure. SSF will
reboost to an upper altitude such that it decays to the
next scheduled Space Shuttle rendezvous altitude.
System Design
The present altitude strategy has been a major driver
for determining system design related requirements.
The current lifetime altitude strategy represents the
absolute minimum allowable altitudes for SSF
operations. This will cause SSF to operate in a more
dense region of the atmosphere, resulting in maximum
reboosts and aerodynamic torques. Designing
systems to meet the needs of SSF at this minimum
altitude will ensure the most flexible system design
capable of surviving a variety of real world operational
contingencies.
Several influences on SSF system design are
incorporated into the lifetime strategy. For example,
the rendezvous altitudes follow the solar activity. This
takes advantage of the solar cycle not only in terms of
increasing Space Shuttle payload-to-orbit, but also in
varying the SSF reboost. The current altitude strategy
is employed to support design studies and size the
propulsion system, specifically, the size of the on-
board propellant storage tanks. In a recent trade study
it was determined that the propellant tanks could be
sized to reduce life cycle costs. This would be
accomplished by using the largest tanks that would fit
in the cargo bay of the Space Shuttle as well as fulfill
the requirements for the largest reboost. The maximum
raboost occurs during the rise in the solar cycle curve,
six to eight months prior to peak solar activity. The
propulsion system has been designed to the maximum
reboost of a +20 atmosphere at SSF maturity, since
SSF mass has a direct influence on the amount of
propellant required for reboost.
Propellant specific impulse lisp ) also has an influence
on propulsion system design; the lower the Isp, the
more propellant required for a particular reboost. As a
result of the SSF Scrub reconfiguration effort (1989),
mono-methyl hydrazine propellant lisp = 230 sac)
propulsion system was baselined for SSF. This results
in larger propellant requirements and higher life cycle
costs than for the previously baselined
hydrogen/oxygen propellant (isp = 370 sac for H2/O2).
The BN affects system sizing as well. The smaller the
BN, the greater the orbital decay, and thus larger
reboosts are required to decay to the same point.
Other systems are indirectly influenced by the altitude
selection. The electrical power system batteries are
sized to provide power during orbital nighttime, a
function of altitude. Some operations are also
influenced by altitude: extra-vehicular activity (EVA)
planning flexibility goes down as the South Atlantic
Anomaly grows in size (which grows larger with
increasing altitude). Many payloads are sensitive to
the i_g environment induced by altitude choice. Finally,
altitude selection plays a key role in the utilization
efficiency of the delivery system (i.e., Space Shuttle).
Decreasing Space Shuttle payload-to-orbit capability
by rendezvousing higher may cause carriers to be
manifested at less than 100% capacity. This indirectly
affects all SSF operations since Space Shuttle will
deliver all resupply requirements for SSF operations.
Operationally, the SSF must never violate the lifetime
altitude limit. While SSF systems have been designed
to operate at or above this altitude limit, the lifetime
altitude represents the point where a deviation from
nominal operations must occur. An operational altitude
strategy will need to provide an altitude safety margin
based on possible operational deviations. These
deviations could include such scenarios as a Space
Shuttle launch slip, missed rendezvous, atmosphere
worsening, or solar cycle phase shifting. While the
lifetime altitude strategy provides design-to altitudes
for system sizing with inherent concerns for SSF
safety, an operational altitude strategy must provide an
additional lifetime margin to allow for the unpredictable
yet expected real world occurrences. The operational
altitude strategy must also incorporate several other
operational considerations as well. These
considerations as well as the factors that influence the
lifetime buffer will be discussed in the next section.
V OPERATIONAL
STRATEGY
ALTITUDE
The emphasis of an Operational Altitude Strategy
(OAS) is overall operations cost, whereas the emphasis
of the current lifetime altitude strategy is system
design. Development of an OAS must consider all
aspects of SSF operations:
On-orbit operations
- aerodynamic disturbance levels
- radiation exposure levels
- contamination
- orbital debris density
- safety (lifetime)
- satellite servicing
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Logistics system operations
- delivery system (Space Shuttle) utilization
- logistics elements utilization
Space Shuttle mission planning
- launch windows
- flight profile/rendezvous
- planning simplicity
- payload-to-orbit capability
Developing an altitude strategy based on any one of the
influences listed above would result in off-nominal
altitudes for all the other influences. Therefore, one
influence must be considered predominant and
altitudes biased off this solution to accommodate the
remaining influences. Program requirements dictate
that the operational altitudes may be chosen anywhere
between an upper and lower altitude limit. The upper
altitude bound is defined by radiation concerns and the
lower limit is definedby orbit lifetime. Flying SSF as low
as possible would maximize the Space Shuttle delivery
capability. However, this does not necessarily
represent the most efficient use of the delivery system.
Given acceptable safety levels, delivery system
utilization efficiency (in the opinion of the authors)
should be considered the primary performance indicator
of any OAS. The Department of Defense estimates that
35-40% of the total operational cost for the military is
logistics. Delivery of resupply from the ground to SSF
is a significant part of the overall logistics cost and
represents an area in which operations cost could be
significantly reduced through careful application of an
OAS.
Optimal Altitudes
Eventually, all operational influences will be
accommodated through biasing optimal altitudes to
the extent required. Initially however, optimal altitudes
must be investigated and understood.
In order to reduce resupply costs, optimal altitudes
must maximize Space Shuttle delivery capability. As
part of resupply, propellant must be delivered.
However, propellant usage is tied directly to altitude
selection. Increasing rendezvous altitudes results in
decreased propellant requirements (reboosts are
smaller since the SSF operates in a less dense region
of the atmosphere), but at the same time, the Space
Shuttle delivery capabilities are also reduced. The
optimal altitude is therefore a balance between SSF
propellant usage and Space Shuttle delivery capability
and can be defined as maximizing the net Space
Shuttle delivery capability on a flight by flight basis
(net = total Space Shuttle delivery capability - SSF
reboost propellant requirements).
The reboost propellant requirements must include
support hardware (tankage and attachments) as part of
the net payload-to-orbit determination. Final propellant
selection will greatly influence the support mass
required. For example, a hydrogen/oxygen propulsion
system has relatively small support mass requirements
since propellant is delivered as water in either a simple
water tank on a fluids carrier or scavenged from the
Space Shuttle fuel cell tanks (no support mass
requirement). On the other hand, hydrazine has large
support mass requirements. Since hydrazine is a very
volatile substance, on-orbit disconnections of
hydrazine fluid lines are restricted. An entire
Propellant Module (PM) (consisting of propellant,
propellant tanks, reaction control system [RCS]
thrusters and structure) must be exchanged each time
propellant is delivered.
Propellant deliveries do not necessarily occur at regular
intervals. Generating optimal altitudes based on
specific flight manifests of PM delivery results in a very
jagged rendezvous altitude profile and may force either
undesirably large reboosts or rendezvous altitudes
which would require a SSF deboost to achieve. For this
reason, the required support mass is evenly distributed
over all flights for purposes of determining a smoother
optimal altitude profile. In order to accomplish this
distribution, each pound of propellant needed to
perform a reboost will require some amount of support
mass. The ratio of support mass to propellant is termed
the mass fraction and is different for each type of
propellant or PM. The currently designed PM requires
approximately 0.7 Ibm of supporting hardware for each
pound of hydrazine delivered..
Optimal Altitude Influences
Optimal altitudes are driven by propellant requirements
which in turn are driven by the SSF BN, SSF mass,
Space Shuttle flight interval, Isp, solar flux (F10.7)
predictions, and propellant mass fraction. In general,
larger propellant requirements result in higher optimal
altitudes.
Currently, working values for each of these influences
are baselined within the SSF Program. However, the
actual value may turn out to be considerably different.
An understanding of how each of these influences
drives the optimal altitudes and how sensitive optimal
altitudes are to these influences is essential for OAS
development.
SSF Ballistic Number
BN characterizes the aerodynamic configuration and
weight of the SSF. Low BNs result in high decay rates,
while high BNs imply low decay rates. Lower BNs result
in higher propellant usage since SSF decay is greater.
Figure 11 shows the optimal altitude sensitivity to BN
changes. This figure plots altitude (x-axis) vs Space
Shuttle delivery capability. The slanted line at the top
represents the total Space Shuttle lift capacity. As the
rendezvous altitude increases, the total Space Shuttle
delivery capacity decreases. The curved lines indicate
the net payload-to-orbit for three values of BN. The
optimal altitude occurs at the highest point on each
curve (the maximum net payload-to-orbit) and is
represented with a A on the graph. Since net payload-
to-orbit is defined as the total Space Shuttle delivery
capacity minus the SSF reboost propellant
requirements, the vertical distance from the total Space
Shuttle lift capacity line to the net payload-to-orbit line
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represents reboost propellant requirements (includes
both propellant and supporting hardware). The figure
shows how the optimal altitudes increase with a
decrease in the BN. Additionally, rendezvous altitudes
derived from the .2 gg, .3 I_g and lifetime altitude
strategies are also presented for comparison. On each
of the parametric plots which follow, the standard case
is identified by a bold line. The conditions for this
standard case are:
BN = 12 Ibt/ft2
SSF Mass - 500000 Ibm
Flight Interval - 90 days
Isp= 230 sec
Solar Flux = Maximum (+20 peak)
and can be used as reference between the various
influences.
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Figure 11: Ballistic Number influence on the Optimal
Altitude
SSF Mass
The more massive the SSF, the more propellant
required for reboost. Although continuous low thrust
burns will actually be used to reboost SSF, the
propellant required to reboost SSF impulsively (infinite
thrust in an instant of time) is very close (< 1%) to the
propellant required using a continuous low thrust burn
and is given by the following relationship:
Prop = SSF Mass ° Ge * (1 - exp(-AV / (Ge * Isp))) (3)
where Ge is the acceleration of gravity at the earth's
surface, AV is the velocity change required to achieve
a circular target orbit based on the height of the
reboost, and Isp is the propellant specific impulse.
Figure 12 shows the optimal altitude sensitivity to SSF
mass. The optimal altitude increases with mass since
propellant requirements are proportional to SSF mass.
Altitudes based on the .2 Ilg, .3 Izg and lifetime altitude
strategies are not affected by SSF mass changes.
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Figure 12: SSF Mass Influence on the Optimal
Altitude
Space Shuttle Flight Interval
Operationally, SSF is assumed to reboost soon after
Space Shuttle departure. The size of the reboost is
determined such that the SSF orbit will decay down to
the appropriate rendezvous altitude by the next Space
Shuttle visit. A longer flight interval results in a longer
decay time and consequently larger reboosts. Figure
13 shows the optimal altitude sensitivity to Space
Shuttle flight interval. The optimal altitude increases
with flight interval. Rendezvous altitudes based on the
.2 I_g, .3 p.g and lifetime altitude strategies are not
affected by flight interval changes.
Multiple reboosts between Space Shuttle visits tend to
decrease the size of each reboost, yet increase the
total propellant requirements for the interval. This is a
direct result of SSF spending more time at lower
altitudes where the atmosphere is more dense. Multiple
reboosts within a flight interval will increase the optimal
altitudes as well as the operational work loads for the
SSF crew and mission support teams, Therefore, a
single reboost is assumed between each rendezvous.
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Figure 13: Space Shuttle Flight Interval Influence on
the Optimal Altitude
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SSF Specific Impulse
The Isp characterizes the efficiency of a propellant.
Less propellant is required to achieve the same reboost
for propellants having higher Isp. Therefore, lower Isp
propellants increase the optimal altitude since
propellant requirements are higher. For example,
hydrogen/oxygen propellant has an Isp of 370 sec, and
hydrazine has an Isp of 230 sec. This translates into
thousands of additional pounds of hydrazine per year
as compared to water. As expected, the optimal
altitude for an Isp of 230 sec is considerably higher
than for an Isp of 370 sec. Reboost propellant for a
given Isp is shown in equation (3).
Figure 14 shows the optimal altitude sensitivity to Isp.
The optimal altitude increases as Isp decreases.
Altitudes based on the .2 I_g, .3 14gand lifetime altitude
strategies are not affected by Isp changes.
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Figure' 14: Isp Influence on the Optimal Altitude
Solar Flux (F10.7)
Atmospheric density is derived from F10.7 values.
Larger F10.7 values increase the derived density and
consequently increase the rate of orbital decay. F10.7
values change with date and atmospheric predictions
(+20 or mean). If all influences discussed above were
to remain constant, optimal altitudes would vary with
the solar cycle.
Figure 15 shows the optimal altitude sensitivity to
F10.7. The optimal altitude increases with increasing
F10.7. Altitudes based on the .2 i_g, .3 p.g and lifetime
altitude strategies also vary with F10.7 changes.
As shown in Figures 11 - 15, the net payload-to-orbit
curves are relatively flat near the optimal points. This
indicates that altitude biases due to other operational
considerations could be accommodated without
significantly impacting net payload-to-orbit. In fact,
assuming average values for each influence, the
rendezvous altitude could vary by +/- 10 nmi with a very
small variance in the net payload-to-orbit. Within this
20 nmi band around the optimal altitude, less than a 500
Ibm net payload loss is experienced. Given the choice
of flying 10 nmi higher or 10 nmi lower, rendezvous
altitudes would be adjusted upward, if possible, to
increase SSF lifetime.
Reaction to Unpredictable Events
An OAS must specify (or levy requirements on SSF
operational concepts) when and how the SSF reacts to
real time changes which drive altitude selection, for
example, Space Shuttle launch delays. Operationally,
SSF lifetime should never drop below the minimum
lifetime level of 90 days to 150 nmi. Depending on the
reasons for the slip, SSF may react before ever
reaching this limit.
Additionally, real time changes in the solar flux could
result in current altitudes with undesirable lifetimes or
which are significantly off-optimal altitudes. Current
thinking suggests that the operational altitudes will be
determined using mean solar flux predictions. As can
be seen in Table 1, recently observed solar flux data
are appreciably greater than the mean predictions for
those dates (Reference 8). Again, how and when
should SSF react to a situation which significantly
deviates from the predicted conditions?
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TABLE 1: Predicted vs. Observed Solar Flux Values
DATE MEAN OBSERVED
Dec. '88 113.2 199.8
Jan. '89 118.4 235.4
Feb '89 120.7 222.4
123.1 205.1
125.9 189.6
Mar. '89
Apr.' '89
May '89
June '89
July '89
Aug. '89
Sep. '89
Oct. '8g
129.2 190.1
132.4 239.6
135.2 181.9
137.5 217.1
139.3 225.9
140.8 208.7
Nov. '89 142.5 235.1
Dec. '89 144.'1 '213.0
Jan. '90 145,3 210.1
Feb. "90 178.3146.4
What circumstances (SSF system failures, Space
Shuttle launch slips, atmosphere worsening, etc.) will
cause SSF to adjust altitude and depart from nominally
planned profiles? How should SSF maintain altitude
under contingency conditions? Such issues must be
addressed in an OAS.
VI CONCLUSIONS
Defining an operational altitude strategy poses
significant challenges by attempting to incorporate and
blend numerous operational considerations. Only
recently has the SSF Program reached a maturity level
to where altitude strategy planners could begin
assimilating and integrating many of the influences and
considerations necessary to develop an operational
altitude strategy. In addition to providing the guidelines
for computing nominal operational altitudes for long
range and near real time planning, an operational
altitude strategy must also be adaptive, providing
procedural road maps as to how and when SSF must
react to real time off-nominal conditions, such as,
Space Shuttle launch slips and unexpected deviations
in atmospheric parameters.
It is important to note that any altitude strategy
ultimately proposed will inherently favor certain
operational aspects over others. This paper has not
attempted to produce a final altitude strategy to be
used for the 30-year operational lifetime of SSF; rather
it attempts to identify and put into perspective the
associated issues and influences which will drive the
development of a final operational altitude strategy.
Realistically, this process will take years of discussion
and prioritization by system, element, and operations
areas before mission planners are *smart" enough to
implement any strategy. Unfortunately, such a
strategy could be of great use in the near term to
efficiently design logistics elements and estimate user
and SSF core support requirements. The authors of
this paper feel that optimal altitudes are an excellent
first cut at an operational altitude strategy providing
considerable flexibility to accommodate future
operational considerations as they become pertinent.
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